From Tribune, 10 August 2007

THE most well-known crisis in the Middle East is, of course, the Arab-Israeli one. Yet it is too easily assumed this is the only crisis – or even the main one. The Arab-Israeli issue does matter, but other crises pending involve Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, the potential collapse of Lebanon once more and the threatened invasion of northern Iraq by Turkey. So while they may not get the same media attention, there are many more crises in the Middle East, often more serious, than the Arab-Israeli one.

The Arab-Israeli dispute is the one which Tony Blair made his big project immediately on leaving office. By trying to solve the Arab-Israeli impasse, the former Prime Minister hopes to undermine the case put by people in the Middle East and beyond for approaching politics as between “us” and “them”. His aim is to demonstrate goodwill on the part of Israel and its backers in the West, thus undermining the idea of a “clash of civilisations”. The theory is that, devoid of this recruiting sergeant and distraction, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and violent Islamists all over the world will be undermined and overpowered. Peace with Israel will foster the new period of democratisation and moderation which Iraq has failed to.

Quite how much of this Blair truly believes is possible is unknown, but he has demonstrated in the past that he likes to go where he can feel the hand of history on his shoulder. In his current mission, however, Blair is destined to fail. It will not be due to him personally, nor to his limited brief of building up Palestinian institutions (which is actually a crucial job). Blair’s failure won’t be because he will be viewed with suspicion by Arab states as being George Bush’s man. It won’t even be due to his role in invading in Iraq. None of these factors will help his cause, but the public diplomacy of which Blair is a part masks the true source of where power lies in the Middle East and where the crises – and the potential solutions – come from: the regional state.

The power structures of the Middle East do not attract regular attention from the Western media, perhaps because, unlike bombings and battles, their function is slow. In the Middle East, a week really isn’t a very long time in politics. But the importance of the regional states is far from abstract. Because of the way power is structured, international powers, including the United States, have limited influence, setting the wider international context but not much more. One look at how Hamas has continued to function despite the international community trying to starve it into submission demonstrates this.

Even more telling is the way the Americans’ oldest strategic partner in the region, Saudi Arabia, not only refuses to recognise Israel but has bankrolled full-scale and low-level wars against it. That Saudi Arabia, while publicly fighting Israel, tacitly backs it against Hezbollah (and Iran) shows how complex the regional picture is.

And these complexities highlight the nature of the Middle East crisis and underpin its intractability. Except Israel, Lebanon and perhaps now Iraq, all Middle Eastern states are opaque and authoritarian. The security of the nation and regime are symbiotic in the geo-political landscape, encouraging a classic realist approach to foreign affairs in which the international system is inherently anarchic and power is a zero-sum game. States adopt causes such as the Palestinians, not as an end in themselves, but to further their own interests.

The Arab-Israeli crisis has been perpetuated and exacerbated to serve state interests, and when it threatened to undermine a state’s interest, the cause of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was betrayed without hesitation. Saddam Hussein’s murder of PLO officials who had met Knesset members to discuss peace; Syria’s invasion of Lebanon to prevent a PLO victory in the civil war – starving to death thousands of refugees at Tel al-Zaatar in the process – in order to bring the Palestinian movement under its control; and Jordan’s expulsion of the PLO with Israel’s help all reflect the cynical reality in which purported friends are to be betrayed and enemies colluded with. In the Middle East, power trumps solidarity – and peace – every time.

If there is one Middle East crisis, it is not to do with Palestine nor Iraq and certainly not the West. It is a crisis of states. It is a crisis borne of authoritarian players who seek to instigate conflict where it is beneficial, undermine peace when it is threatening and crush opportunities for development in the economy, civil society or foreign affairs when it threatens the internal safety and foreign influence of any regime.

This crisis will not be solved by having states sacrifice their own interests – and to hope so is folly. Instead, the crisis can only be solved by a geo-political shift which ensures that state interest is no longer an exclusive, mercantilist product to be fought for at the expense of all else, but one that can be furthered through co-operation. It will not be easy and, if the conflict-ridden history of Europe is any guide, it is likely to be very costly.

This is not a moral task but a geo-political one. Both Egypt and Jordan sought peace with Israel only when their regimes recognised it was in their interests. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others will equally only change their approach in foreign policy – to Israel and each other – when it becomes in their state interest to do so. Trying to solve the Israel-Palestine issue may be one way in which to encourage this change, but the regional states have much more ability to prevent a resolution than Blair has to promote one. And even if he does once again feel the hand of history on his peace-making shoulders, it will not solve any wider Middle East crisis. That will only come with a major transformation in attitudes about how to rule society and interact with others.

The power to effect this transformation is largely in the hands of the Middle East states themselves, and they show no sign of any enthusiasm for doing so. When one considers how durable the regimes in the region have proved to be, it seems clear this Middle East crisis will endure long after Blair has gone.

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